









Creative Commons: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs (CC BY-NC-ND)
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Richardson, P 2015, ''Blue national soil' and the unwelcome return of 'classical' geopolitics', Global Change,
Peace and Security, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 229-236. https://doi.org/10.1080/14781158.2015.989199
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 11. May. 2021
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=cpar20
Global Change, Peace & Security
formerly Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change
ISSN: 1478-1158 (Print) 1478-1166 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cpar20
‘Blue national soil’ and the unwelcome return of
‘classical’ geopolitics
Paul Richardson
To cite this article: Paul Richardson (2015) ‘Blue national soil’ and the unwelcome
return of ‘classical’ geopolitics, Global Change, Peace & Security, 27:2, 229-236, DOI:
10.1080/14781158.2015.989199
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/14781158.2015.989199
© 2015 The Author(s). Published by Taylor &
Francis.
Published online: 03 Feb 2015.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 2860
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Citing articles: 1 View citing articles 
COMMUNICATION ARTICLE
‘Blue national soil’ and the unwelcome return of ‘classical’ geopolitics
Paul Richardson*
School of Arts, Languages, and Cultures, University of Manchester, UK
This paper discusses how geopolitical visions from an earlier century are being reanimated in
certain quarters of the political, intellectual, and military elite in the United States in order to
frame recent shifts in China’s status in the international system. However, these deterministic
geopolitical lenses – like the historical antecedents they draw on – are misconceived and
counter-productive, missing the sophistication and fluidity of world politics. It is suggested
here that such reductionist geopolitical categories instead work to narrow the space
for mutual understanding and deny the multiple versions of power and sovereignty in the
world today.
Keywords: geopolitics; sovereignty; hegemony; China; United States
An invited and an uninvited empire
In certain quarters of the United States’ foreign policy community, reductionist geopolitical cat-
egories from a previous age are once again being reanimated as devices for delivering supposed
insights into the contemporary international system, and for explaining and interpreting China’s
current ambitions in world politics. While these clouded geopolitical lenses bring a certain degree
of clarity – by effacing and erasing the intricate and dynamic nuances of place and politics – they
simultaneously work to narrow the space for mutual understanding and obscure the interconnect-
edness and shared interests of states within our world.
In these geopolitical visions, the community of states around the South China Sea is being
framed as on the brink of fracturing along bi-polar lines. On the one hand, this has been achieved
by rehabilitating the rhetoric and practices of ‘classical’ geopolitics in order to interpret China’s
elevated status in regional and world politics, while at the same time there has been an affirmation
of the United States as a benign hegemon in the Asia–Pacific region, which is guaranteeing order,
stability, and the ‘global commons’. It is a process that has assumed a new urgency and signifi-
cance after the catastrophes of US foreign policy in the Middle East.
The enduring image of the United States as a benevolent hegemon is widely accepted by a
broad coalition of US elites and has been succinctly outlined in a recent paper by John Ikenberry,
who sketches a world where the United States has established leadership not simply through the
exercise of power but together with sustained efforts at global problem solving and rule making.1
It is an order based on the superstructure of a US-led network of alliances, institutions, geopoli-
tical bargains, client states, and democratic partnerships, where the United States is an ‘empire by
*Email: paul.richardson-3@manchester.ac.uk
1 G. John Ikenberry, ‘The Illusion of Geopolitics: The Enduring Power of the Liberal Order’, Foreign Affairs 93, no. 3
(2014), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141212/g-john-ikenberry/the-illusion-of-geopolitics (accessed July 28,
2014).
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invitation’.2 This corresponds to what the geographer John Agnew has termed the globalist sover-
eignty regime, where various international and global norms over human rights, economic and
monetary policy, and governmental behaviour – largely conceived and promoted by the US –
have spread to other states’ political and judicial practice.3
This globalist hegemonic order rests on the United States’ ability to exercise extra-territorial
sovereignty through military supremacy and global reach, at the same time as occupying a pos-
ition at the centre of world politics through leverage of the global financial system, complex
regional alliances, and cultural ‘soft power’.4 In this there are certain features of Hardt and
Negri’s understanding of Empire, which they regard as a ‘U.S. constitutional project’ based on
a ‘model of rearticulating an open space and reinventing incessantly diverse and singular relations
in networks across an unbounded terrain’.5
Such a model of networked sovereignty necessitates its constant affirmation by political elites
at the highest level. It is a concept encapsulated in President Barack Obama’s West Point Com-
mencement Speech, when in May 2014 he noted that ‘From Europe to Asia, we are the hub of
alliances unrivalled in the history of nations’.6 His speech was followed just days later by then
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hegel stating at the Shangri-La security forum that, ‘Today,
perhaps more than ever, one of America’s greatest sources of strength is its network of partners
and allies’.7 The dilemma for this networked sovereignty regime is that the rise and fall of states –
both within and outside of this network – causes great confusion, consternation, uncertainty, and
insecurity amongst the policy elites articulating it. The rest of this paper attempts to chart how
certain members of the political, military, and intellectual elite in the United States have used
the rhetoric of ‘classical’ geopolitics to contrast the rapidly changing role of China in the inter-
national system with the supposed order and stability of the prevailing US-led globalist regime.
The global commons versus ‘blue national soil’
The sharpest distinctions over China’s geopolitical/territorial challenge to the globalist order have
comemost recently through representations of its claims over scraps of land at sea, and the vast mar-
itime zones that come with them. This is posed as a challenge to the benign hegemony of the United
States, which – in this version of world politics – is entrusted with preserving the ‘global commons’.
As FrankHoffman, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, has put it:8
For many years, Britain’s Royal Navy was the ultimate guarantor of the global commons. That great
tradition and responsibility was transferred to the American Navy after World War II. For the better
part of the last half century, the U.S. Navy [has] ensured strategic access and served as the principal
protector of international stability.9
The potential rupture to this stability became sharply emphasized after China’s 2009 claim to the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf at the United Nations of a ‘nine-dashed line’,
2 Ibid.; Geir Lundestad, ‘Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952’, Journal of Peace
Research 23, no. 3 (1986): 263–77.
3 John Agnew, Globalization and Sovereignty (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009).
4 Ibid., 131–2.
5 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), xiv, 182.
6 Barack Obama, ‘Obama Sees US as the “Hub of Alliances” Unrivaled in History’, Atlantic Council, May 28, 2014,
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/obama-sees-us-as-the-hub-of-alliances-unrivaled-in-history
(accessed July 28, 2014).
7 Chuck Hegel, ‘The United States’ Contribution to Regional Stability’, Shangri-la Security Summit 2014, May 31,
2014, https://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/2014-c20c/plenary-1-d1ba/chuck-hagel-a9cb
(accessed June 3, 2014).
8 Part of the National Defense University, Washington, DC.
9 Frank Hoffman, ‘TheMaritime Commons in the Neo-Mahanian Era’, in Contested Commons: The Future of American
Power in a Multipolar World, ed. Abraham Denmark and James Mulvenon (Washington, DC: Center for a New Amer-
ican Security, 2010), 52.
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which covers most of the South China Sea.10 In the wake of this announcement, China became
increasingly represented as a ‘territorial’ rival to the norms and values that the globalist state
claims to uphold. An op-ed by George Will in the Washington Post in March 2011 captured
the concerns amongst a broad swathe of US policy elites when it stated that ‘China seems increas-
ingly inclined to define the oceans off its shores as extensions of the shores – territory to be owned
and controlled like “blue national soil”’.11 In The Diplomat, James Holmes, Professor of Strategy
at the US Naval War College, suggested that China’s claim to this ‘blue national soil… envisions
exercising the absolute territorial sovereignty at sea that governments exercise within their land
frontiers. It would reserve the right to infringe on freedom of navigation’.12 For Holmes, it is
imperative that the ‘commons must remain the commons, lest the system of liberal trade and com-
merce collapse on itself’.13
At the policy level, Hillary Clinton, then US Secretary of State, declared at the ASEAN
Regional Forum in Hanoi in July 2010 that, ‘The United States has a national interest in
freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons and respect for international
law in the South China Sea’.14 The following year, the United States Senate voted unani-
mously to pass a resolution ‘supporting the continuation of operations by U.S. armed forces
in support of freedom of navigation rights in international water and air space in the South
China Sea’.15
Accompanying this political response to China’s maritime claims has been a proliferation of
articles amongst academics and Washington-based think tanks on how Chinese officials and offi-
cers are feverishly studying the ideas of the nineteenth century American naval strategist Alfred
Thayer Mahan. They are apparently enthusiastically embracing Mahan’s theories of ensuring
command over the sea through the concentration of naval forces, control of strategic locations,
and the importance of a decisive engagement to neutralize an enemy’s fleet. An article in
Foreign Affairs by the journalist and self-proclaimed geopolitical analyst Robert D. Kaplan16
claimed that:
Still an insecure sea power, [China] thinks about the ocean territorially… In thinking in such a zero-
sum fashion about their country’s adjoining seas, China’s naval leaders are displaying the aggressive
philosophy of the turn-of-the-twentieth-century U.S. naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan, who
argued for sea control and the decisive battle.17
Kaplan is not alone in making an analogy with Mahan, and parallels have been drawn between
today’s situation in the South China Sea, and the United States’ bid for pre-eminence in the
10 Robert Beckman and Tara Davenport, ‘CLCS Submissions and Claims in the South China Sea’, East Sea Studies,
August 16, 2011, http://nghiencuubiendong.vn/en/conferences-and-seminars-/second-international-workshop/608-
clcs-submissions-and-claims-in-the-south-china-sea-by-robert-c-beckman-a-tara-davenport (accessed January 23,
2013). China’s official declaration of the nine-dashed line is also now emblazoned on newly issued Chinese pass-
ports; see Patrick M. Cronin, ‘As the World Rebalances in the Asian-Pacific Century, so must the United States’,
Global Asia 7, no. 4 (2012), http://www.globalasia.org/Issue/ArticleDetail/62/as-the-world-rebalances-in-the-asian-
pacific-century-so-must-the-united-states.html (accessed January 22, 2014).
11 George Will, ‘The “Blue National Soil” of China’s Navy’, Washington Post, March 18, 2011, http://articles.
washingtonpost.com/2011-03-18/opinions/35208579_1_mahan-china-and-east-china-powerful-navy (accessed
January 20, 2013).
12 James Holmes, ‘The Commons: Beijing’s “Blue National Soil”’, The Diplomat, January 3, 2013, http://thediplomat.
com/2013/01/a-threat-to-the-commons-blue-national-soil/ (accessed January 20, 2013).
13 Ibid.
14 NguyenManh Hung, ‘Drawing a Line in the South China Sea: Why Beijing Needs to Show Restraint’,Global Asia 7,
no. 4 (2012), http://www.globalasia.org/Issue/ArticleDetail/70/drawing-a-line-in-the-south-china-sea-why-beijing-
needs-to-show-restraint.html (accessed January 22, 2014).
15 Ibid.
16 Kaplan is a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security in Washington. In 2009, he was appointed to the
Defense Policy Board, a federal advisory committee to the United States Department of Defense.
17 Robert D. Kaplan, ‘The Geography of Chinese Power’, Foreign Affairs 89, no. 3 (2010): 22–41, http://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/66205/robert-d-kaplan/the-geography-of-chinese-power (accessed January 22, 2014).
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Caribbean over a century before.18 Hoffman refers to a ‘neo-Mahanian era’,19 while Holmes
suggests that, ‘Like the [Caribbean] waterways that obsessed Mahan, [the South China Sea] con-
tains waterways of critical importance to national prosperity…Geography has concentrated
minds in Beijing’.20
At the same time as invoking Mahan, other scholars and commentators have drawn parallels
to China’s ambitions and the administration of James Monroe (1817–25) and the desire to keep
European powers out of the Americas. Stephen Walt insisted in a New York Times article, entitled
Dealing with a Chinese Monroe Doctrine, that, ‘By the same logic, a powerful China will not
want the United States to have close alliances and a large military presence near its borders,
and it will undoubtedly try to push U.S. forces out of the Asia-Pacific region’.21
Such consternation reveals a fear in some quarters that from a Mahanian/Monroeian perspec-
tive, geostrategic control of the South China Sea (just as it did for the United States in the Car-
ibbean) will herald a revision of the current world order. An affirmation of the benefits of this
prevailing order has seemingly become a key focus of US policy towards the region. As Tom
Donilon, National Security Advisor to the President (2010–13), recently asked: would safe sea
lanes have fuelled Pacific commerce, and would smaller nations have been protected from dom-
ination by bigger neighbours without the US guarantee of security and stability?22 For Donilon
the answer is obvious and the US turn to the Asia Pacific is ‘a response to the strong demand
signal from leaders and publics across the region for U.S. leadership, economic engagement, sus-
tained attention to regional institutions and defense of international rules and norms’.23 These
appeals to ‘stability’, ‘demand signals’, ‘institutions’, ‘rules and norms’ represent key features
of a globalist understanding of US sovereignty, which work to legitimate a particular response
to the ‘territorial’ challenge that China is apparently posing to Asia’s maritime ‘commons’.
Mackinder’s long shadow
Alongside Mahan and Monroe, there has also been a flurry of interest in the geographer, poli-
tician, and champion of the British Empire, Sir Halford Mackinder, who, in 1904, wrote
his famous and evocatively titled paper ‘The Geographical Pivot of History’.24 Mackinder
believed that the arrival of a network of railways across Inner Eurasia (a region that he termed
the ‘Pivot Area’, and later the ‘Heartland’) would provide tsarist Russia – or whichever state con-
trolled this space – with the mobility necessary to claim, exploit, and defend the resources of a
vast continental area.25 As he famously put it: ‘Who rules the Heartland commands the World
Island [the joint continent of Europe, Asia, and Africa]; Who rules the World Island commands
the World.’26
It does not take a close reading of Mackinder to note the insecurities and challenges that this
scenario would pose to the British Empire and its worldwide network of trade, overseas territories,
18 James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, ‘China’s “Caribbean” in the South China Sea’, SAIS Review 26, no. 1 (2006):
79–92.
19 Hoffman, ‘The Maritime Commons’.
20 James Holmes, ‘China Takes a Page out of Mahan’, Taipei Times, February 6, 2006, http://www.taipeitimes.com/
News/editorials/archives/2006/02/06/2003291824 (accessed February 26, 2013).
21 Stephen Walt, ‘Dealing with a Chinese Monroe Doctrine’, New York Times, May 2, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/
roomfordebate/2012/05/02/are-we-headed-for-a-cold-war-with-china/dealing-with-a-chinese-monroe-doctrine
(accessed December 28, 2012).
22 Tom Donilon, ‘Remarks by Tom Donilon, National Security Advisor to the President: “The United States and the
Asia-Pacific in 2013”’, March 11, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/11/remarks-tom-
donilon-national-security-advisory-president-united-states-a (accessed November 13, 2013).
23 Ibid.
24 Halford Mackinder, ‘The Geographical Pivot of History’, Geographical Journal 23, no. 4 (April 1904): 421–37.
25 Ibid.
26 Halford Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality (London: Constable and Company, 1919), 194.
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military bases, access to resources, naval supremacy, and the economic, political, and military
advantages associated with its leadership of the prevailing global system at the time. While
Mackinder was proved entirely wrong – it was in fact the United States that assumed the
primacy Great Britain had once occupied – this detail has not affected the enduring appeal of
his imperial geopolitics.
Not for the first time, Mackinder’s ideas have found a new appreciation as a device for inter-
preting contemporary events in world politics. In his 2010 Foreign Affairs article, Kaplan
recalled the closing lines of Mackinder’s paper and its ‘disturbing reference to China’.27 He
noted how Mackinder had posited that should the Chinese expand their power well beyond
their borders, then they ‘might constitute the yellow peril to the world’s freedom just
because they would add an oceanic frontage to the resources of the great continent’.28
Kaplan is convinced that China’s ‘blessed geography’ – as a land and sea power – ensures
the country ‘will stand at the hub of geopolitics’ in the current century.29 He uses the logic
of Mackinder in exactly the way the British imperialist had done a century earlier: to frame a
geopolitical threat to the world’s pre-eminent, hegemonic, globalist power, and the appropriate
response of containment.30
However, what is perhaps most intriguing about the reanimation of Mackinder’s ideas, is that
this appreciation of ‘classical’ geopolitics has expanded beyond the sphere of foreign affairs pun-
ditry and one of its most notable advocates has been Admiral Patrick Walsh, former Commander
of the US Pacific Fleet (2009–12). Walsh has specifically cited the merits of Mackinder in a
number of interviews, asserting that by applying Mackinder’s geographic insights to Asia,
‘You can identify where the critical node is’.31 For Walsh, this happens to be the South China
Sea and for any country to exert economic, political, diplomatic, or military influence beyond
its own region, it requires ‘control of, or a sustained presence in, a “strategic pivot”’.32 As he
makes clear, this pivot should determine where the US positions its forces, as if China is
allowed to exert its sovereignty unchecked in this region then he insists that it ‘can change the
norms of behaviour… you can’t let one country just sort of dominate all of that economic activity
and expect that the world would continue to function as it is’.33
Walsh’s strategic concept – outlined in a classified paper produced while still Commander of
the Pacific Fleet – appeared to have inspired some influence beyond his Pearl Harbor headquarters
when his Mackinderian logic surfaced in a well-known article by Hillary Clinton in Foreign
Policy magazine in November 2011.34 In this article, Clinton stresses in the space of a few
lines how ‘the United States stands at a pivot point’; ‘we need to accelerate efforts to pivot to
new global realities’; and ‘[t]his kind of pivot is not easy, but we have paved the way for it
over the past two-and-a-half years’.35 As is clear from the rest of her article, much of this
27 Kaplan, ‘The Geography’.
28 Mackinder, ‘The Geographical Pivot’, 437.
29 Kaplan, ‘The Geography’.
30 See also the discussion in Monika Chansoria and Paul Richardson, ‘Placing China in America’s Strategic “Pivot” to
the Asia-Pacific: The Centrality of Halford Mackinder’s Theory’, CLAWS Journal (Summer 2012): 78–87.
31 Richard Halloran, ‘The Rising East: Walsh looks to Mackinder for Naval Strategy’, Honolulu Civil Beat, January 20,
2012, http://www.civilbeat.com/articles/2012/01/20/14645-the-rising-east-walsh-looks-to-mackinder-for-naval-strategy/
(accessed November 27, 2013).
32 Katherine Hyde, ‘Operation Tomodachi: Support, Compassion, Commitment’, Japan Society, November 15, 2011,
http://www.japansociety.org/page/multimedia/articles/operation-tomodachi-support-compassion-commitment
(accessed November 27, 2013).
33 Yoichi Kato, ‘Interview: Patrick Walsh: South China Sea could be a New “Strategic Pivot”’, Asahi Shimbun, March
21, 2012, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/china/AJ201203210024 (accessed November 27, 2013).
34 Halloran, ‘The Rising East’.
35 Hillary Clinton, ‘America’s Pacific Century’, Foreign Policy, November 10, 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century (accessed December 3, 2013), emphasis added.
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‘pivoting’ is of a military orientation – a trajectory since confirmed by a series of deployments in
the region and joint military exercises with US allies and partners in the South China Sea.36
Although at the official level, the language of ‘pivot’ has more recently been softened to a
‘rebalancing’,37 there endures the perceived necessity of consolidating an image of the United
States as a benevolent hegemon, overseeing the ‘commons’, and the guarantor of the global/
regional order. Just as in the age of Mackinder, representations of this order – and more precisely
the challenges to it – are revealing much about the anxieties and apprehensions of certain
members of the globalist elite, and rather less about China’s motivations and preoccupations in
global and regional politics. Such framings – perhaps intentionally – are simultaneously
working to reduce the space for alternative Chinese behaviour.38
It is also perhaps unsurprising that the Mackinderian logic underpinning the US ‘pivot’ did not
go unnoticed in China, and shortly after Clinton’s announcement, Deputy Director of the PLA’s
Academy of Military Sciences Zhiyuan Lin stated in the People’s Daily that the United States had
already ‘strengthened penetration in China’s surrounding regions’.39 He also made reference to
how some thinkers in the US Navy have become quite interested in the English geographer
Halford Mackinder and his idea of ‘who rules the Heartland commands the World Island’.40
However, here Lin inverts such neo-Mackinderian visions, suggesting that those followers of
Mackinder in the United States who are applying his strategy to Asia are convinced that control-
ling the South China Sea will permit the US Air Force and Navy to command East Asia, and con-
sequently to command the World Island.41 For Lin, it is China defending the heartland – and itself
– from the grand imperial designs of the United States.
Laying to rest the ghosts of geopolitics past
This inversion of a Mackinderian framing of the region illustrates precisely how reductionist geo-
political lenses serve to polarize perspectives and engender insecurity on both sides. These geo-
political visions deny the complexities and contingencies of world politics, working to obfuscate
China’s shared interest in furthering aspects of the prevailing globalist regime. This paper is not
the first to point out that China broadly has the same shared interests as the United States in areas
such as nuclear non-proliferation; that China is an active participant in mechanisms and insti-
tutions of global governance; and how, in certain cases, China has even gone further than the
United States in ratifying international agreements – notably the UN Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS).42 Scholars have also demonstrated how two decades ago China made
the voluntary decision to pursue deepening international integration; to further pro-market
domestic reforms; to bind itself by international regimes; and to support the existing, economi-
cally liberal global trading regime, and its major institutional enforcer, and symbol – the
36 Andrew Billo, ‘Co-operate and Share: A Way to Peace in the South China Sea’, Global Asia 8, no. 3 (2013), http://
www.globalasia.org/Issue/ArticleDetail/467/Co-operate-and-Share:-A-Way-to-Peace-in–the-South-China-Sea-.html
(accessed December 4, 2013); Robert Ross, ‘The Problem with the Pivot: Obama’s New Asia Policy is Unnecessary
and Counterproductive’, Foreign Affairs 91, no. 6 (2012): 70–82, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138211/
robert-s-ross/the-problem-with-the-pivot (accessed January 22, 2014); BBC News online, ‘Leon Panetta: US to
Deploy 60% of Navy Fleet to Pacific’, June 2, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-18305750
(accessed January 22, 2014).
37 See Donilon, ‘Remarks’.
38 Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell, ‘How China Sees America’, Foreign Affairs 91, no. 5 (2012): 32–47, http://
www.foreignaffairs.com/search/how%20china%20sees%20america (accessed January 22, 2014); Oliver Turner,
‘“Threatening” China and US Security: The International Politics of Identity’, Review of International Studies 39,
no. 4 (2013): 923.
39 Zhiyuan Lin, ‘America Threatens China: What Lies Behind the U.S. “Return to Asia” Strategy’, People’s Daily,
December 29, 2011, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/102774/7689639.html (accessed December 3, 2013).
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 See Ikenberry, ‘The Illusion’.
234 P. Richardson
WTO.43 As a result of its emergence as a major exporter with a persistent trade surplus within this
system, China has increasingly come to share with the United States and the European Union a
desire to pursue a bold trade liberalization agenda.44 In this sense – and with China being for a
number of years the primary holder of US treasury securities – the policies associated with the
continued rise of China and the maintenance of US hegemony have often become complemen-
tary.45
However, this is not to say that these mutual interests or China’s adherence to global norms
and rules in the region is absolute. Indeed, there is a growing tension between China’s repeated
commitments to respecting international law, and its more assertive and unilateral actions in the
South and East China Sea. Recent examples have included Chinese reclamation projects on the
Spratlys (such as at South Johnson Reef, where there are suggestions China is planning to con-
struct an airstrip);46 the positioning in May 2014 of an oil rig of the state-run China National Off-
shore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) to waters near the Paracel Islands, within what Vietnam
considers its exclusive economic zone;47 the establishment in November 2013 of an Air
Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea;48 and in June 2014 a refusal to
accept a request by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at the Hague to respond to a mem-
orandum on China’s territorial and maritime claims filed by the Philippines in March 2014 under
UNCLOS.49
Despite these actions, China remains careful to avoid or limit any perception of rejecting inter-
national norms. The establishment of China’s ADIZ is represented as not being in direct violation
of existing international rules or precedents on the establishment of ADIZs;50 China is also only
the latest of the claimants to instigate island reclamation projects on the Spratlys,51 while the
CNOOC oil rig near the Paracels was withdrawn just two months after its placement.52
However, perhaps the most striking rejection of international agreements is China’s refusal to
accept the PCA’s arbitration under UNCLOS.53 Yet even here, the authority of UNCLOS is
eroded by the United States’ inability to add its signature to the Convention. As President




46 Andrew Erickson and Austin Strange, ‘Pandora’s Sandbox: China’s Island Building Strategy in the South China Sea’,
Foreign Affairs, July 13, 2014, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141632/andrew-s-erickson-and-austin-
strange/pandoras-sandbox (accessed October 21, 2014); Manuel Mogato, ‘Philippines Says China Appears to be
Building an Airstrip on Disputed Reef’, Reuters, May 13, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/14/us-
philippines-china-reef-idUSBREA4D00K20140514 (accessed October 21, 2014).
47 Ernest Bower and Gregory Poling, ‘China–Vietnam Tensions High over Drilling Rig in Disputed Waters’, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, May 7, 2014, http://csis.org/publication/critical-questions-china-vietnam-
tensions-high-over-drilling-rig-disputed-waters (accessed October 21, 2014).
48 Eric Heginbotham, ‘The Foreign Policy Essay: China’s ADIZ in the East China Sea’, Lawfare, August 24, 2014,
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/08/the-foreign-policy-essay-chinas-adiz-in-the-east-china-sea/ (accessed October
21, 2014).
49 ‘China Dismissed Philippine Court Case over Sea Row Claims’, BBC News, June 5, 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-asia-27724283 (accessed October 21, 2014).
50 Shannon Tiezzi, ‘How China Justifies its ADIZ – And How it Could Do Better’, The Diplomat, December 4, 2013,
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Obama has ruefully noted: ‘It’s a lot harder to call on China to resolve its maritime disputes under
the Law of the Sea Convention when the United States Senate has refused to ratify it.’54
The failure of the US Senate to endorse a twenty-first century mechanism for maritime dispute
resolution misses a critical opportunity to widen the space for mutual understanding with China,
to bind itself – and China – to the rules and norms it claims to uphold, and with it a chance to
decisively counter the re-emergence of obsolete geopolitical theories that once rationalized
past imperialism. Instead these tired geopolitical representations have been given space to exacer-
bate tensions in the region, deny complementarities, and belie the fact that China is seeking to
guarantee its access to the global system rather than to deny others. They serve to over-determine
and ossify understandings of China’s behaviour into hard, bounded, deterministic conceptualiz-
ations, which miss the myriad of linkages, interconnections, and dynamism that define
sovereignty, the global economy, and international relations in the modern age. Rather than pro-
viding critical insights into predicting China’s actions in regional or world politics, these geopo-
litical framings work to intensify Chinese fears of containment, at the same time as they expose
the prevailing fractures, anxieties, and insecurities of the globalist regime.
Whether it is because of their simplicity and ease of intelligibility, or the rhetorical power of
charismatic and idiosyncratic advocates, or simply their play to an audience receptive to reassur-
ance and stasis in times of rapid change, these geopolitical visions refuse to dissipate. It is through
underplaying the role of global trade and finance, a disregard for the multiple versions of sover-
eignty and power that exist in the world, and a denial of the possibility for alternative perspectives
in world politics that have allowed Mackinder, Mahan, and Monroe back onto the centre-stage of
the globalist regime. Recognizing the inherent limitations of these defunct and deterministic geo-
political tropes is perhaps a starting point for ameliorating the dangerous and destabilizing pro-
cesses that their uncritical recycling has initiated.
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